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Deal Breakage in Domestic and 
Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions: New Data and 







  This Article presents a newly constructed mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) data set that can support detailed analysis of 
deal outcomes, including deal breakage. The main novelty of the 
data set is a detailed classification scheme for characterizing deal 
outcomes, using information drawn from public announcements 
and news reports. The data set also includes a number of 
variables, hand gathered from press releases and merger 
agreements, that are unavailable in existing data sets in reliable 
form, or at all. The data set consists of all definitive, signed M&A 
transactions involving US public company targets with a deal 
value of at least $1 billion from 1996 to 2018. The data set 
excludes negotiations, hostile bids, and unsolicited offers not 
resulting in a definitive transaction, which cannot be compared 
apples to apples with deals involving definitive agreements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Richard Beattie of the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
LLP—one of the leading corporate lawyers of his generation—had this 
to say two decades ago about legal practice in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A): “Generally the business people want to get the transaction 
done, to happen, and they want it to happen with the partner they’ve 
picked. But legally you can’t always do what they want. Which is why 
business people don’t like lawyers.”1 As Beattie implied, clients rely on 
their M&A counsel to deliver deal certainty: to get the deal closed on 
the agreed economic terms.2 Deal certainty can mean somewhat 
different things for acquiring companies and target companies. For 
acquirors, it largely means providing deal “protection”: basically, 
preventing the target company from accepting a higher (“topping”) bid 
from a third-party interloper.3 For targets, it largely means preventing 
the acquiror from walking away from the transaction prior to closing 
due to “buyer’s remorse” or for other reasons. Both parties typically 
rely on legal counsel to help them secure any necessary regulatory 
approvals.4 
 Despite the importance of deal certainty to M&A legal practice, 
deal breakage or termination—the failure of a signed M&A deal to 
reach closing, for whatever reason—has not received systematic 
 
1. Interview by John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian with Richard I. 
Beattie, Chairman, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (July 23, 1999), quoted 
in Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 1013, 1073 (2017).  
2. Id.  
3. See, e.g., Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill 
Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 932–33 (2013) 
(describing deal protection provisions in M&A). 
4. See Ilene Knabel Gotts & Franco Castelli, Watchell Lipton Discusses U.S. 
M&A Antitrust Enforcement for 2019 and the Year Ahead, COLUM. LAW SCH. BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu [https://perma.cc/JH89-QBJ6] 
(archived Feb. 16, 2020) (highlighting the role of legal counsel in clearing regulatory 
hurdles). 
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treatment from legal scholars.5 This gap in the literature can be 
attributed in part to limitations of available M&A data sets, which do 
not include reliable and detailed information about deal breakage.6 
 This Article describes a newly constructed M&A data set that can 
support detailed analysis of deal outcomes, including deal breakage. 
The key innovation of the data set is a detailed classification system 
for characterizing deal outcomes, using information drawn from press 
releases and other public announcements, as well as news reports. The 
data set consists of all definitive M&A deals involving US public 
company targets with a deal value of at least $1 billion from 1996 to 
2018. The data set excludes negotiations, letters of intent, hostile bids, 
and unsolicited offers not resulting in a definitive transaction.7 
 Analysis of M&A deal breakage should be of interest to business 
law scholars and M&A practitioners. It should also be of interest to 
investors in public securities markets. When companies are being 
acquired, their stock prices tend to be driven primarily by the prospect 
of deal success or failure, including the prospect of material 
amendments to the consideration offered.8 Merger arbitrage—the 
practice of investing in the securities of publicly traded companies that 
are parties to pending M&A transactions—is a major “event-driven” 
investment strategy among institutional investors, especially hedge 
funds.9 Accurate historical data can assist merger arbitrage 




5. Prior studies that have examined some aspects of deal breakage include 
Matthew D. Cain, Antonio J. Macias & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Broken Promises: The 
Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting and Strategic Default, 40 J. CORP. L. 
565, 566 (2015) (examining 227 private equity acquisitions between 2004 and 2010); 
John C. Coates, Darius Palia & Ge Wu, Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to 
Bidder and Target Shareholders? 1–2 (Working Paper, 2019) (studying the relationship 
between M&A contractual provisions and deal outcomes for 819 US publicly traded 
target firms for the period 2001–2011). 
6. See Cain et al., supra note 5; Coates et al., supra note 5.  
7. Some prior studies have lumped definitive deals with other situations, 
arguably comparing apple and oranges. See, e.g., Jia Wang & Ben Branch, Takeover 
Success Prediction and Performance of Risk Arbitrage, 15 J. BUS. & ECON. STUD. 10, 16 
(2009) (describing various predictor variables used in the data set in addition to 
definitive deals); Ronald W. Masulis & Serif Aziz Simsir, Deal Initiation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 53 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2389, 2390 (2018) (distinguishing 
among deal types considered by the study). 
8. See infra note 35. 
9. See KATE WELLING & MARIO GABELLI, MERGER MASTERS: TALES OF 
ARBITRAGE 1, 2 (2018) (defining “merger arbitrage” as “seeking profits by trading 
securities involved in announced corporate events . . . in such a way as to limit the 
trader’s risk, should the expected event fail to happen”); Sheng Wang et al., Systematic 
M&A Arbitrage, DEUTSCHE BANK MKTS. RESEARCH (Sept. 28, 2015). 
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II. DEAL UNIVERSE 
 The present study is concerned with definitive M&A transactions 
involving US public company targets from the beginning of 1996 
through the end of 2018, with a deal value of at least $1 billion. More 
specifically, the data set consists of all M&A deals meeting the 
following criteria:  
• Definitive transactions only. The data set includes definitive 
M&A deals only, meaning the parties must have signed a 
definitive transaction agreement. Negotiations that did not 
result in a signed merger agreement are not included. Neither 
are rebuffed, unsolicited, or hostile offers in which the target 
never agreed to a deal. Such situations are not “broken deals” 
for purposes of this study since no agreement was reached in 
the first place. 
• 1996 to 2018. The data set includes deals signed on or after 
January 1, 1996, and concluded (whether by completion or 
termination) not later than December 31, 2018. The starting 
date of January 1, 1996, was chosen because 1996 was the first 
year in which all US public companies were required to use the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR 
database for their securities law filings.10 Consequently, 
definitive merger agreements are publicly available and have 
been downloaded for all deals in the deal universe, permitting 
a rich set of variables to be gathered.11 
• US target companies. The data set is limited to US target 
companies. (The acquiring company, by contrast, may be a US 
or foreign firm.) Limiting the data set to US targets ensures 
public availability of definitive merger agreements and a 
reasonable degree of uniformity of governing law.12 
• Public company targets. The data set is limited to deals with 
publicly traded target companies; it excludes all deals where 
the target company is private. (The acquiror, by contrast, may 
be public or private.) M&A transactions with public company 
targets differ from those with private company targets along a 
number of significant dimensions. Public company deals 
typically trigger requirements under the federal proxy rules 
 
10. Electronic Filing and the EDGAR System: A Regulatory Overview, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/regoverview.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 
2006) [https://perma.cc/Q7UB-26DP] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (detailing the history of 
electronic filing via the EDGAR system).  
11. Id. 
12. Of course, corporate and contract law vary by state, and some regulatory 
approvals (particularly for public utilities) happen at the state level, so there is some 
variation in relevant law even for US-only deals. 
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and/or tender offer rules,13 whereas private company deals 
usually do not.14 In addition, private company deals commonly 
include provisions relating to postclosing indemnification, as 
well as “earn-out” provisions under which the consideration to 
be paid depends to some extent on the postclosing performance 
of the target company’s business.15 Such provisions are far less 
common in public company deals.16 Also, as explained below, 
deals with public company targets make it possible to study the 
premium paid as well as the “arbitrage spread”17 in the 
transaction; these concepts do not apply where the target is a 
private company. Finally, definitive merger agreements are 
available through the SEC’s EDGAR database for all deals 
involving public company targets, whereas most private 
company merger agreements are not publicly available. 
• $1 billion and up. “Deal value” refers to the value of the 
transaction excluding assumed liabilities. The arbitrary $1 
billion value cutoff was selected to make data gathering 
manageable. The data set is currently being augmented to 
include deals between $500 million and $1 billion in value. 
 To construct the deal universe, transactions with the foregoing 
characteristics were downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ Securities 
Data Company (SDC) Platinum database, which contains exhaustive 
coverage of global M&A transactions from the 1970s to the present.18 
However, in constructing the deal universe, the raw SDC Platinum 
download needed to be adjusted for the following reasons:19 (1) In some 
cases, unsuccessful negotiations were coded as definitive deals. 
Because this study is concerned only with deals in which there was a 
signed, definitive M&A agreement, these were excluded. (2) In some 
cases, acquisitions of partial stakes were coded as whole-company 
deals. These were excluded. (3) In some cases, subsidiary dispositions 
and other deals with private company targets were coded as public 
company deals. Because the present study is concerned only with 
transactions involving US public company targets, these deals were 
 
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(a) (2012) 
(solicitation of proxies); see also § 14(d)–(e) (tender offers).  
14. § 14(a), (d)–(e). 
15. Brian J.M. Quinn, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: The 
Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 144 (2012) 
(presenting evidence that “earnouts are much more common in transactions where the 
seller is a private firm.”). 
16. Id. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See SDC Platinum Fact Sheet, THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 2014), 
https://my.refinitiv.com/content/dam/myrefinitiv/products/9086/en/BrochuresandF/sdcp
latinumfactsheet1214.pdf [https://perma.cc/B44U-MY38] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) 
(describing the various features of the SDC Platinum database).  
19. Items requiring adjustment were identified in the data-gathering process as 
press releases and definitive transaction agreements for each deal were reviewed. 
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excluded. (4) In a few cases, so-called two-step M&A transactions—
transactions involving a first-stage tender offer followed by a second-
stage squeeze-out merger—were coded as two separate deals. These 
deals are two parts of a single M&A transaction and should therefore 
only appear once. Duplicate entries were excluded. (5) In a handful of 
cases, foreign target companies were coded as US companies. These 
were excluded from the data set. 
 SDC Platinum also provides an “Attitude” field that records 
whether the transaction was “Friendly,” “Hostile,” or “Unsolicited.”20 
However, hostile bids and unsolicited offers commonly lead to 
definitive agreements between the parties, at which point they become 
“friendly” deals. SDC Platinum has an “Attitude Change Flag,” which 
appears to be intended to indicate when a hostile offer turns into a 
friendly definitive transaction, but this variable turns out to be highly 
unreliable. SDC Platinum also has a “Definitive Agreement Y/N” 
variable that should, in principle, indicate whether a definitive 
transaction agreement was signed between the parties. This field, too, 
is unreliable; the present research identified more than three hundred 
transactions in which this field was coded as “No” but in which a 
definitive transaction agreement was filed in the SEC’s Edgar 
database.21 In constructing the data set, all deals were individually 
reviewed to confirm the existence of a definitive transaction 
agreement, and deals not involving definitive transaction agreements 
were excluded. 
 After the manual adjustments, the resulting deal universe 
consists of 1,763 deals meeting the criteria specified above. 
III. DEAL OUTCOMES 
 Most M&A deals are completed on the originally announced 
economic terms, but other outcomes are also observed. In constructing 
the data set, each deal was assigned an outcome—a “grade” of A, B, C, 
D, or F—as follows: 
• Alternate deal. Target company accepts a third-party topping 
bid. 
• Bump in consideration. Merger agreement is amended to 
increase the per-share consideration paid to target 
shareholders. 
 
20. Some deals were coded by SDC Platinum as “Neutral” or “Not Applicable,” 
the meaning of which is not clear. The attitude of each of these deals was verified by 
examining company press releases. See id. 
21. Cf. Coates et al., supra note 5, at 3 (“[W]e manually collect[ed] [M&A 
agreement] clauses whereas prior studies use SDC data. We find that SDC often has 
incorrect information about specific M&A contract clauses.”). 
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• Completed. Deal is consummated on the originally announced 
economic terms. 
• Decrease in consideration. Merger agreement is amended to 
decrease the per-share consideration paid to target 
shareholders. 
• Failure. Deal is canceled for reasons other than a successful 
topping bid. 
 These five outcomes are ordered roughly from best to worst from 
the perspective of target company shareholders.22 In A and B deals, 
target shareholders receive consideration in excess of what the original 
merger agreement called for. In C deals, target shareholders receive 
the consideration specified in the original merger agreement. In D 
deals, target shareholders receive consideration below what the 
original merger agreement called for. In F deals—the main focus of this 
study—target shareholders receive no consideration because the deal 
is canceled. 
 The data set further breaks down F deals into three categories: 
acquiror withdrawal, target withdrawal, and regulatory block. In 
acquiror withdrawals, the acquiror fails to consummate the 
transaction despite the wishes of the target. Typically, the acquiror 
claims that some condition to the consummation of the deal has not 
been satisfied. The acquiror may claim that circumstances have 
changed since the deal was signed—for example, a deterioration in the 
target’s business, or an inability to raise external financing given 
market conditions—entitling or forcing the acquiror to terminate the 
deal. In a small number of cases, transactions were terminated because 
the acquiring company’s shareholders voted the deal down.23 
 In a target withdrawal, the target company backs out of the deal 
in a situation in which an alternate deal (third-party topping bid) is 
not present.24 This is a very uncommon deal outcome.25 Most M&A 
transactions contemplate that target shareholders will receive a 
premium for their shares, and target companies generally do not want 
to forgo the premium.26 In the data set, target withdrawals typically 
involve situations in which the target has agreed that its shareholders 
will receive consideration in the form of acquiror stock under a fixed 
exchange ratio, and the acquiror’s stock price has nosedived since the 
signing of the transaction, rendering the consideration unattractive.27 
 
22. See infra Part III, Table 1. 
23. See infra Part VIII (acquiror shareholders are entitled to vote on the deal only 
in some circumstances).  
24. See, e.g., Masulis & Simsir, supra note 7. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. at 2400 (finding average and median takeover premia of fifty-four 
percent and forty-four percent, respectively, in a large sample of M&A transactions). 
27. See, e.g., Humana Calls Off Merger, CNN MONEY (Aug. 10, 1998), 
https://money.cnn.com/1998/08/10/deals/united/ [https://perma.cc/7DBL-9G2N] 
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In these (rare) cases, it may be in target shareholders’ economic 
interest to vote against the transaction.28 The parties may also 
mutually agree to terminate the transaction in such circumstances.29 
These mutual terminations are coded in the data set as target 
withdrawals. 
 Regulatory blocks involve any situation in which a regulatory 
agency blocks a deal.30 US and foreign antitrust authorities are the 
most common sources of regulatory blocks in the data set. Regulatory 
blocks can also come from sectoral regulators, such as federal bank 
regulators, the Federal Communications Commission, state public 
utility commissions, and the like. The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is empowered to block 
acquisitions of US companies by foreign companies where the 
transaction implicates US national security.31 A handful of deals in the 
data set were blocked by CFIUS; most involved acquiring companies 
domiciled in China.32 
 SDC Platinum provides data fields that are pertinent to deal 
outcomes, but these fields do not contain sufficient (or sufficiently 
reliable) data to allow outcomes to be assigned at the level of 
granularity just described. Specifically, SDC Platinum has an 
“Outcome” field that classifies deals as “Completed” or “Withdrawn.” 
However, this field classifies deals in which the target accepted third-
party topping bids (category “A” above) as withdrawn deals. While SDC 
Platinum also provides an “Outcome” field, which in some cases is 
coded as “Sold to Other Bidder” or “Sold to Raider,” the field is not 
reliably coded; in a number of deals involving successful third-party 
topping bids, the “Outcome” field does not indicate this outcome. SDC 
Platinum also has a “Value Amended” field that purports to indicate 
when there was an increase or decrease in the consideration paid to 
shareholders (categories “B” and “D” in the typology described above). 
However, this field too is inconsistently coded: a large number of deals 
not involving any amendment to the consideration are coded in SDC as 
 
(archived Feb. 16, 2020) (“Humana Inc. is pulling the plug on its $5.5 billion merger with 
United HealthCare Corp., citing a $2.9 billion drop in United HealthCare's stock value.”). 
28. See id. 
29. Id. (“The two companies said they had ‘mutually agreed’ to end the union and 
that the decision was approved by both boards of directors.”). 
30. See infra Part III, Table 1. 
31. See The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-
committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/PP2C-APJM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (explaining the role of CFIUS and 
the transactions it is authorized to review).  
32. The attempted 2007 acquisition of 3Com Corporation by Bain Capital and 
Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies is an example. See Bain Says It Has 
Terminated 3Com Deal, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2008), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/bain-says-it-has-terminated-3com-deal/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZEA2-874S] (archived Feb. 5, 2020).  
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involving such an amendment. Finally, while SDC Platinum offers a 
“Synopsis” field describing each deal, it does not consistently provide 
enough information to decipher deal outcomes at the level of 
granularity described above. 
 Consequently, in constructing the data set, deals had to be 
manually reviewed to assign outcomes. For every deal, company press 
releases between the signing date and outcome date were reviewed for 
each transaction to determine the deal outcome. In cases of deal 
breakage, specific reasons for deal failure were recorded based on press 
releases, news reports, and SEC filings (principally 8-K filings). As a 
cross check, target company stock prices as of the outcome date were 
compared with the originally agreed consideration per share to verify 
the value received by target shareholders as of consummation. 
 
Table 1. Deal Outcomes 
 
 Table 1 presents the resulting deal outcomes for the 1,763 
transactions in the data set. Approximately 90 percent of deals were 
completed on the originally announced economic terms. Of the 
remaining deals, a little over 4 percent achieved “premium” (A or B) 
outcomes, meaning the target either agreed to a transaction with a 
third party on superior economic terms or extracted additional 
consideration from the original acquiror. Around 6 percent of deals 
resulted in “adverse” outcomes, meaning either a contractual decrease 
in consideration or deal breakage (failure).  
IV. MARKET EXPECTATION OF DEAL BREAKAGE 
 How good is the market at judging deal breakage risk at the time 
a deal is announced? As noted in Part I, merger arbitrage specialists 
seek to profit from the spread between the per-share consideration and 
the trading price per share of target companies in pending M&A 
Count Percent
A - Alternate Deal 33 1.9%
B - Bump in Consideration 43 2.4%
C - Completed as Announced 1,580 89.6%
D - Decrease in Consideration 17 1.0%
Acquiror Withdrawal 38 2.2%
Regulatory Block 30 1.7%
Target or Mutual Withdrawal 22 1.2%
F - Failure 90 5.1%
1,763 100.0%
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transactions.33 To the extent capital markets are efficient, deal spreads 
should equilibrate to a level that compensates the merger arbitrageur 
for the risk she assumes in taking a long position in the target 
company’s stock. The main risk is the possibility that the deal will 
break, causing the target’s stock price to fall back to the “unaffected” 
price it would fetch without the deal.34 
 The deal spread thus conveys information about the market’s 
estimate of the likelihood that a deal will break. To illustrate, consider 
a hypothetical deal in which one company (the target) agrees to be 
acquired by another company (the acquiror) for $30 per share in cash. 
Prior to announcing the deal, the target company’s common stock is 
trading at an unaffected price of $20. The deal premium is therefore 50 
percent (premium of $10 divided by unaffected price of $20). Assume 
for simplicity that the target company does not pay dividends on its 
common stock and that the risk-free rate is zero (no time value of 
money). Assume also that market participants assign zero probability 
to any third-party topping bid or amendment of consideration.  
 When the deal is publicly announced, the target’s stock price 
immediately rises to (say) $28. What probability does the market 
assign to deal breakage? The probability can be calculated as the deal 
spread of $2 (that is, the $30 in per-share consideration minus the $28 
market price) divided by the premium of $10 (that is, the $30 in per-
share consideration minus the $20 unaffected price), or 20 percent. In 
trader terminology, this is the “market-implied probability” of deal 
breakage.35 In the simplified setting described here, market-implied 
probability of breakage consists of the deal spread divided by the deal 
premium.  
 In practice, merger arbitrageurs must adjust this calculation for 
the relevant risk-free rate (assumed in the example above to be zero), 
as well as expected target dividends per share between the signing date 
and the projected closing date.36 Also, in deals involving stock 
consideration, the merger arbitrageur must short the acquiring 
company’s stock in order to “lock in” the spread,37 requiring additional 
adjustments to the calculation of the market-implied probability of 
 
33. See, e.g., Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristics of Risk and Return 
in Risk Arbitrage, 56 J. FINANCE 2135, 2135 (2001) (“After the announcement of a merger 
or acquisition, the target company’s stock typically trades at a discount to the price 
offered by the acquiring company. The difference between the target’s stock price and 
the offer price is known as the arbitrage spread. Risk arbitrage, also called merger 
arbitrage, refers to an investment strategy that attempts to profit from this spread. If 
the merger is successful, the arbitrageur captures the arbitrage spread.”). 
34. See Samuel G. Hanson, Merger Arbitrage at Tannenberg Capital, HARV. BUS. 
SCH. 1–3 (Jan. 2, 2018). 
35. See id. at 3 (“[A]n arbitrageur [can] back out a market-implied “break-even” 
probability of deal failure by using the net deal spread and a downside estimate.”). 
36. See id. at 2. 
37. Shorting involves taking a position that will produce positive returns if the 
security’s price falls.  
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deal breakage in order to account for expected acquiror dividends 
between signing and closing, as well as stock borrow fees that are 
incurred in the process of shorting.38 
 Table 2 presents the market-implied probabilities of deal 
breakage for all deals in the data set, broken down by deal outcome. 
These probabilities were calculated on the basis of arbitrage spreads 
as of the day following deal announcement, adjusted for the relevant 
risk-free rate, projected quarterly dividends prior to closing, and 
estimated stock borrow fees. The average market-implied probability 
of breakage for all deals is 12.7 percent, measured as of deal 
announcement.39 This is considerably higher than the observed 5.1 
percent incidence of actual deal failure.40 A number of possible 
explanations for this divergence can be hypothesized. One explanation 
might be that merger arbitrageurs have systematically overestimated 
deal risk in the time period under study. It seems doubtful, however, 
that sophisticated investors would systematically overestimate deal 
risk over a period spanning over two decades. Another possible 
explanation might be that merger arbitrageurs expect deals to fail in 
correlated fashion during “crisis” periods, making deal risk more 
difficult to diversify (or more expensive to hedge) and thus causing 
required risk premiums in merger arbitrage to be higher than they 
would otherwise be. A third, related explanation might be that merger 
arbitrageurs “correctly” anticipate the risk of crisis periods and 
impound this risk into their trading decisions, but that such crises 
happened to be underrepresented in the twenty-three-year period 
under study. In other words, perhaps over a century or more, 12.7 
percent of deals would ordinarily fail, but the twenty-three-year period 
studied here just happened to contain only one major crisis event (i.e., 









38. See Hanson, supra note 34, at 2.  
39. Specifically, the market-implied probability of failure is calculated on the 
basis of the deal spread observed at the close of trading on the trading day following the 
deal announcement. 
40. Rob Copeland, This Old School Hedge Fund Is Going Quant, WALL. ST. J. 
(May 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-old-school-hedge-fund-is-going-quant-
1495635267 [https://perma.cc/NQ9H-HHEM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (According to a 
2017 news report, hedge fund Magnetar Capital studied historical deal failure over a 
three-decade period and found that “while 7% of announced transactions eventually 
collapse, the market behaves as if nearly twice as many do.”). While the deal universe 
they were studying isn’t disclosed, my findings are roughly consistent with theirs. 
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Table 2. Market-Implied Probability of Deal Breakage 
 
 
 Broken down by deal outcome, the market on “Day 1” assigns 
higher probabilities of failure to deals that go on to fail (24.3 percent 
on average) than to deals that go on to close on the announced terms 
(12.0 percent). In other words, the market appears to successfully 
identify ex ante which deals are more likely to break. Risk arbitrageurs 
clearly do not have perfect foresight, however. For deals that went on 
to break, the market on Day 1 assigned a 75.7 percent chance of 
ultimate completion—in other words, arbitrageurs believed deal 
completion was much more likely than not. 
V. TIME TRENDS 
 Have patterns of deal breakage changed during the twenty-three-
year period under study? No obvious patterns emerge from the data. 
Figure 1 shows “Adverse Outcome Incidence” by year of deal 
announcement. “Adverse outcome” is defined as deals that break due 
to either regulatory blockage or acquiror withdrawal, plus deals in 
which there is a decrease in consideration—in other words, all deals 
with outcomes of D or F, excluding F deals where the target withdrew. 
In several years (2002, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2018) there were no deals 
with adverse outcomes. 2015 was an outlier, with 12.3 percent of deals 
announced that year experiencing adverse outcomes, driven by an 
unusual number of regulatory blocks. Deals announced in 2007 had the 
next highest level of adverse outcomes, at 8.5 percent, driven by 













% of All 
Deals
Market-implied 
p(failure) on "Day 1"
A - Alternate Deal 33 1.9% 10.5%
B - Bump in Consideration 43 2.4% 13.1%
C - Completed as Announced 1,580 89.6% 12.0%
D - Decrease in Consideration 17 1.0% 18.9%
F - Failure 90 5.1% 24.3%
All Deals 1,763 100.0% 12.7%
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Figure 1. Time Trends 
 
 
 Figure 1 also shows the average “Day 1” market-implied 
probability of deal breakage by year. Notably, the market-implied 
probability of failure exceeds realized adverse outcome incidence in 
every year. In addition, a time trend is apparent: the first five years 
have the five highest values on this metric. The actual incidence of 
adverse outcomes for deals announced in those years was, however, 
typical. In other words, the spread between market expectation and 
realized outcomes seems to have narrowed somewhat after 2000. What 
might explain these trends? One possibility is that market participants 
learned over time to more accurately judge deal risk.41 Another related 
possibility is that merger arbitrage may have been an undercapitalized 
investment strategy in those earlier years.42 Several years of high 
returns may have attracted more capital to the strategy, lowering 
spreads and bringing market-implied probabilities of failure somewhat 
closer to reality.43 
 John Coates has observed that between 1996 and 2015, M&A 
contracts more than doubled in size as well as in measures of linguistic 
complexity.44 Impressionistically, contractual growth has not 
 
41. Joseph A. McCahery & F. Alexander D. Roode, The Lost Decade for Hedge 
Funds: Three Threats 23–24 Table 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper 
in Law No. 486, 2019). 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See John C. Coates IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from 
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obviously affected the incidence of adverse deal outcomes as defined 
herein. The extent to which specific contractual features are associated 
with greater likelihood of deal completion is a key topic for further 
study. 
VI. TARGET COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 
 The deal universe under study consists of transactions involving 
US public company targets with a deal value of at least $1 billion. Even 
within these constraints, the characteristics of target companies vary 
in a number of respects that correlate with adverse outcomes. This 
section looks at two dimensions of variation: target company industry 
and size. 
A. Target Industry 
 It would not be surprising to find that adverse deal outcomes 
correlate with the target company’s industry in predictable ways. The 
incidence of regulatory blocks, for example, might be expected to be 
elevated in industries in which sectoral regulators are empowered to 
block transactions, such as in portions of the financial services, 
telecommunications, and public utility industries.45 In addition, one 
might predict that the incidence of acquiror withdrawals and decreases 
in consideration would be elevated in industries with high underlying 
business volatility (such as the technology sector), and correspondingly 
muted in industries with low underlying business volatility (such as 
public utilities, which are legally shielded from competition and are 
subject to rate regulation).46 
 To enable these and related hypotheses to be tested, all target 
companies in the data set were assigned to one of nine industries: 
Technology; Real Estate and Lodging; Energy, Metals, and Mining; 
Healthcare; Financial Services; Consumer/Retail; Diversified 
Industries; Media and Telecommunications; and Public Utilities. This 
classification system corresponds to the common method of industry 
 
333, 2016) (examining core findings that the quantity of M&A contracts and the language 
of those contracts both grew in complexity over a twenty-year period).  
45. The Federal Reserve, the Federal Communications Commission, and state 
public utility commissions are empowered to block business combinations in large 
portions of the banking, telecommunications, and public utility sectors, respectively. See, 
e.g., 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1842(a) (Federal Reserve Board approval required for bank holding 
company acquisitions); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214(a) (F.C.C. approval required for certain 
acquisition transactions). 
46. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN 
A NUTSHELL 8 (4th ed. 1999) (“In connection with public utility regulation . . . the ruling 
agency will specify who can enter the business, what service they must provide, what 
prices they may lawfully charge . . . and what investments they can include in their rate 
base.”). 
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classification that securities firms employ in their equity research and 
investment banking operations.47 These assignments were based on 
each company’s primary industry code under the North American 
Industrial Classification System (NAICS), which are provided by SDC 
Platinum.48 First, each NAICS code was manually classified into one 
of the nine industries. Second, each company was assigned to one of 
the nine industries based on the company’s primary NAICS code. 
 Figure 2 shows adverse outcomes by target company industry, and 
it reveals some surprises. Neither financial services deals nor media 
and telecommunications deals exhibit a high incidence of regulatory 
blocks, despite the power of sectoral regulators to block many of these 
transactions. Indeed, apart from public utilities, consumer/retail deals 
have the highest rate of regulatory blocks, despite the fact that few 
consumer/retail transactions are subject to sectoral regulatory 
approval; almost all of these regulatory blocks were on antitrust 
grounds. Deals with public utility targets do, however, conform to the 
prediction of a high incidence of regulatory blocks. Public utility deals 
are uniquely exposed to regulatory risk in the form of state public 
utility commissions. In other sectors, regulatory blocks—whether 
attributable to sectoral regulators or antitrust authorities—are driven 
by federal regulators (or, in the case of antitrust, overseas regulatory 














47. About Us – Investment Banking, J.P. MORGAN, 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/about/investment-banking (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/Z6G3-GHXX] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (For example, J.P. Morgan’s 
website indicates the following industry coverage groups in its investment banking 
division: Consumer & Retail; Diversified Industries; Energy; Financial Institutions & 
Governments; Financial Sponsors; Healthcare; Real Estate & Lodging; and Technology, 
Media & Telecom. This is very similar to the industry groups shown in the figure, the 
only difference being that the figure (1) breaks out Technology from Media and Telecom, 
(2) breaks out Public Utilities from Energy, and (3) omits Financial Sponsors (i.e., private 
equity firms, which appear only as acquirors and never as targets in the deal universe)).  
48. North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/8E6Z-SZSH] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (NAICS is the standard used by 
federal agencies in classifying US business establishments for statistical purposes).  
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Even more surprising is the incidence of acquiror withdrawals and 
decreases in consideration by industry. Deals with technology company 
targets, far from having a high incidence of these adverse outcomes, 
have the lowest, with only 1.6 percent of technology company deals 
failing on account of acquiror withdrawals, and zero of these deals 
involving a contractual decrease in consideration. Likewise, deals with 
public utility targets, far from having a low incidence of acquiror 
withdrawals and decreases in consideration, have by far the highest, 
at 8.1 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively. Further study is needed to 
explain this outlier status. In any case, acquiror withdrawals and 
decreases in consideration do not seem to be heavily driven by the 
volatility of the target company’s industry. 
B. Target Size (Deal Value) 
 How does the incidence of adverse deal outcomes correlate with 
deal value (a reasonable proxy for the size of the target company)? It 
would be reasonable to expect that, holding everything else constant, 
larger deals would encounter greater regulatory resistance—in 
particular from antitrust authorities—because market power is likely 
to increase with company size.49 No such clear hypothesis suggests 
 
49. Stephen Epstein et al., Mergers and Heightened Regulatory Risk, HARV. LAW 
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itself with respect to acquiror withdrawals and decreases in 
consideration, however. One might, for example, predict that larger 
target companies would retain higher quality deal counsel—
experienced (but expensive) M&A attorneys—leading to “tighter” 
contracts and fewer acquiror withdrawals or renegotiations. At the 
same time, acquirors would likewise be expected to retain higher 
quality counsel in larger, higher-stakes deals, leading to transaction 
agreements that present more optionality to acquirors to eject in the 
event of a change of heart. In that case, acquiror counsel might 
neutralize the effect of target counsel. 
 Deal value is available from SDC Platinum. Figure 3 shows 
adverse deal outcomes by deal value, broken down by octile, with each 
octile containing either 220 or 221 transactions. The octile ranges are 
as follows: first octile, $1.0 billion to $1.3 billion; second octile, $1.3 to 
$1.6 billion; third octile, $1.6 to $2.0 billion; fourth octile, $2.0 billion 
to $2.6 billion; fifth octile, $2.6 billion to $3.6 billion; sixth octile, $3.6 
billion to $5.6 billion; seventh octile, $5.6 billion to $10.3 billion; eighth 
octile, $10.3 billion and up. 
 
Figure 3. Deal Value 
 
 
 The figure suggests that, overall, adverse deal outcomes tend to 
increase with deal value. The seventh and eighth octiles have the 
highest overall incidence of adverse outcomes, at 7.7 percent each. The 
composition is different, however: the seventh octile is driven primarily 
by a high level of acquiror withdrawals, whereas the eighth octile is 
driven by regulatory blocks. Consistent with the hypotheses suggested 
 
[https://perma.cc/7UJ2-B69E] (archived Feb. 21, 2020) (“[I]t is clear that it has become 
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above, regulatory blocks are correlated with the largest deals: the 
seventh and eighth octiles have the largest incidence of regulatory 
blocks, at 2.3 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively. No clear pattern 
emerges with respect to the other two categories of adverse outcomes 
(acquiror withdrawals and decreases in consideration). 
VII. ACQUIRING COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 
 As described above, the deal universe under study consists of deals 
with US public company targets. No restriction is placed on acquiror 
characteristics, however. The data set therefore includes transactions 
involving not just US but also foreign acquirors, and not just public but 
also private acquirors. This section examines deal outcomes along 
several acquiror characteristics: acquiror nationality, acquiror size (for 
public company acquirors), and financial versus strategic acquirors. 
A. Acquiror Nationality 
 US acquirors outnumber foreign acquirors in the deal universe by 
a ratio of around four to one. How do US and foreign acquirors stack 
up when it comes to deal outcomes? SDC Platinum supplies an 
“Acquiror Nation” field for each transaction in the deal universe under 
study here. Figure 4 shows that the incidence of adverse deal outcomes 
has been higher for the US than for foreign acquirors. While the 
incidence of regulatory blocks is roughly the same, the combined 
incidence of acquiror withdrawals and downward adjustments are 
more than twice as high for the US than for foreign acquirors, at 3.5 
percent and 1.6 percent, respectively. Of course, transactions with US 
acquirors and foreign acquirors may differ systematically in other ways 
that are pertinent to deal outcomes, so caution is warranted in 
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Figure 4. Acquiror Nationality 
 
B. Acquiror Size 
 Approximately 83 percent of the transactions in the deal universe 
involved public company acquirors. In these transactions, the size of 
the acquiror (as measured by equity market capitalization) can be 
observed. Generally speaking, one would hypothesize that deals with 
larger acquirors would face more regulatory risk, since larger acquirors 
are more likely (all else equal) to possess more market power ex ante.50 
As for whether large acquirors are more or less likely than smaller 
acquirors to withdraw from pending transactions, no obvious 
hypothesis suggests itself. Figure 5 shows adverse deal outcomes by 
acquiror size, broken down by quartile. Equity market capitalizations 
were downloaded from Bloomberg L.P.51 As expected, regulatory blocks 
increase with acquiror size. More interesting is the relationship 
between acquiror size and the other types of adverse deal outcomes 
(acquiror withdrawals and decreases in consideration). These 
nonregulatory adverse outcomes have occurred far more frequently in 
the bottom and second quartiles than in the third and top quartiles of 
acquiror size. For acquirors in the top quartile—those with a market 
cap north of $37 billion—acquiror withdrawals are extremely 
 
50. Epstein et al., supra note 49 (“[I]t is clear that it has become increasingly 
difficult to obtain antitrust approval of large mergers.”). 
51. See Stocks, BLOOMBERG L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/stocks 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9JTJ-7CRR] (archived Feb. 16, 2020) 
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uncommon, occurring in only 0.3 percent of cases, versus an incidence 
of 3.0 percent in the bottom two quartiles combined.  
 
Figure 5. Acquiror Size 
 
  
 Why might larger acquirors walk away from deals less frequently? 
One hypothesis is that they sign “better” deals by, for example, doing 
more thorough due diligence and thereby avoiding postsigning buyer’s 
remorse. A second hypothesis, in tension with the first, is that larger 
acquirors are poor negotiators and fail to include provisions in their 
agreements affording optionality to back out of a deal that turns out to 
be bad. A third possibility is that larger acquirors give up this 
optionality not because they are bad negotiators but because they 
systematically trade optionality for other deal terms. Fourth, because 
(holding everything else constant) any given acquisition is “lower 
stakes” for a larger acquiror than for a smaller one, larger acquirors 
might more readily decide to bite the bullet and complete a deal whose 
fundamentals have gone south. Further research is needed on this 
topic. 
C. Strategic versus Financial 
 M&A acquirors can be classified as either “strategic acquirors” or 
“financial acquirors.” Financial acquirors are private equity funds, 
which are in the business of collecting money from large capital 
suppliers (pension funds, university endowments, very wealthy 
individuals, etc.) in order to acquire companies for a limited time 
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of their investments through either privately negotiated sales or public 
offerings of securities.52 Private equity firms aim to produce high 
returns for their investors in part by improving the operations of the 
companies they acquire.53 Acquisitions by private equity firms 
typically involved large amounts of debt (leverage) and are therefore 
often referred to as leveraged buyouts (LBOs).54 Strategic acquirors, 
by contrast, are operating companies that intend to integrate the 
target with their existing operations rather than to sell it later for a 
profit. 
 Conventional wisdom among deal practitioners and market 
participants is that financial acquirors are more likely than strategic 
acquirors to fail to consummate transactions.55 In part this is because 
of private equity’s heavy reliance on debt financing. When debt 
markets experience disruption, private equity firms may be unwilling 
or unable to consummate pending M&A transactions. This happened 
repeatedly in 2007 and 2008, when private equity funds backed out of 
announced public company acquisitions of Huntsman Corporation, 
Sallie Mae, United Rentals, and Penn National Gaming, among 
others.56 On the other hand, one might hypothesize that regulatory 
blocks would be observed less frequently in financial acquiror deals 
than in strategic acquiror deals, since strategic acquirors by definition 
seek to integrate the target company with existing (possibly competing) 
operations, whereas financial acquirors may or may not have existing 
portfolio company operations that are within or adjacent to the target’s 
business line.57 
 SDC Platinum supplies a Y/N field for “Acquiror is a Leveraged 
Buyout Firm,” but this field contains large numbers of errors; some 
acquisitions by well-known private equity firms such as Apollo Global 
Management, Blackstone Group, and KKR & Co. are misclassified as 
non-LBOs. In addition, many “club deals” involving multiple private 
equity acquirors are misclassified as non-LBOs, as are acquisitions by 
existing private equity portfolio companies. In view of these errors, a 
new “financial acquiror” field was constructed by reviewing 
announcement press releases for each deal. 
 
52. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 219, 222–24 (2009). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 481, 520 (2009) (“Strategic transactions lack the optional nature of private equity 
acquisitions.”). 
56. See id. at 498, 502, 514; Cain et al., supra note 5, at 566. 
57. See Strategic vs. Financial Buyer, CORP. FIN. INST., 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/strategic-buyer-vs-
financial-buyer/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/DEV7-ARQ4] (archived 
Feb. 21, 2020). 
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 Figure 6 shows adverse deal outcome incidence by acquiror type 
(strategic versus financial acquirors). The data are consistent with the 
conventional wisdom and with the hypotheses described above: 
financial acquirors have withdrawn from deals at nearly twice the 
frequency of strategic acquirors. On the other hand, deals with 
strategic acquirors have experienced regulatory blocks at twice the 
frequency of deals with financial acquirors. 
 
Figure 6. Strategic versus Financial Acquirors 
 
 
 While these statistics should be interpreted with caution, they 
provide suggestive evidence that target companies should seek to 
extract a premium when negotiating a sale to a private equity firm, 
given the possible higher likelihood of deal breakage. This topic merits 
further study. 
VIII. TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS 
 Which aspects of deal structure influence deal outcomes? This 
Part uncovers some correlations that are visible in the data set; 
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A. Acquiror Shareholder Vote 
 Whether or not the acquiring company’s shareholders are entitled 
to vote on the deal might be expected to affect deal completion rates. 
In M&A deals involving public company targets, shareholders of the 
target company virtually always have the right to vote on the deal.58 If 
the acquiror is a public company, its shareholders may or may not be 
entitled to vote on the deal.59 The interaction of deal structure with the 
governing law of the acquiring company’s jurisdiction determines 
whether the acquiring company’s shareholders have such an 
entitlement.60 Generally speaking, if the acquiring company is a US 
public company, its shareholders are entitled to vote on the transaction 
only if the transaction involves an issuance of stock that increases the 
acquiring company’s number of shares outstanding by more than 20 
percent.61 If the acquiror is not a US company, the governing law in its 


















58. “Voting” may consist of electing to tender shares into a tender offer. 
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 252 (2019). 
60. See id. 
61. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rule 5635(a)(1)(B), NASDAQ STOCK MKT., 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp
%5F1%5F1%5F3%5F3%5F8%5F3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequit
yrules%2F (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5MUC-GW9Y] (archived Apr. 18, 
2020) (shareholder approval); Shareholder Approval § 312.03(c)–(d), N.Y.S.C. LISTED CO. 
MANUAL, https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-company-
manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-
D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D--WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-94 (last visited Feb. 
16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7P4B-JHVC] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) (shareholder approval). 
62. See, e.g., A GUIDE TO TAKEOVERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, SLAUGHTER & 
MAY 5 (Mar. 2020), https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/39320/a-guide-to-
takeovers-in-the-united-kingdom.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ESN-QAPQ] (archived Apr. 5, 
2020) (describing UK listing rules requiring approval by the offeror’s shareholders under 
certain circumstances). 
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Figure 7. Acquiror-Side Shareholder Vote 
 
 
 It would be reasonable to hypothesize that deals conditioned on an 
acquiror-side shareholder vote would, everything else equal, 
experience a higher rate of adverse outcomes, given the additional 
midstream veto point on the deal.  In constructing the data set, merger 
agreements for each deal were reviewed to determine whether the deal 
was conditioned on an acquiror-side shareholder vote. About one-third 
of the merger agreements contain such a condition. As shown in Figure 
7, these deals had an adverse outcome incidence nearly twice that of 
deals where no acquiror-side shareholder vote was required. 
B. Type of Consideration 
 How does consideration type—all cash, all stock, or a mix of the 
two—correlate with deal outcomes? On the one hand, using all-cash 
consideration commonly allows deals to be closed more quickly, barring 
significant antitrust or other regulatory hurdles.63 On the other hand, 
private equity (leveraged buyout) transactions are virtually always all-
cash deals and are widely perceived to present an elevated risk of 
acquiror withdrawal.64 
 SDC Platinum includes information on consideration type. As 
shown in Figure 8, all-cash deals have a lower overall incidence of 
 
63. See GUIDE TO ACQUIRING A US PUBLIC COMPANY, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 
11–12 (2015), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-acquiring-a-us-public-
company-for-the-non-us-acquirer [https://perma.cc/X842-GWAN] (archived Apr. 5, 2020) 
(describing speed advantage of two-step, all-cash transactions). 
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adverse outcomes than other consideration types. All-cash and all-
stock deals have an equal incidence of acquiror withdrawals, but all-
stock deals were more than twice as likely as all-cash deals to be 
blocked on regulatory grounds. This stands to reason: very large deals, 
which are associated with elevated antitrust risk, are 
disproportionately all stock. An interesting finding is that adverse 
outcomes apart from regulatory block (i.e., acquiror withdrawals and 
decreases in consideration) are elevated in mixed consideration (cash 
and stock) deals. Indeed, these (nonregulatory) adverse outcomes are 
more than twice as common in mixed-consideration deals as in all-
stock and all-cash deals. 
 
Figure 8. Type of Consideration 
 
C. Premium 
 Most M&A transactions are announced at a premium: the agreed 
per-share consideration as of the signing date exceeds in value the 
unaffected, standalone trading price of the target company’s shares.65 
 
65. There are exceptions; for example, in a so-called merger of equals transaction, 
target company shareholders typically receive little or no premium—indeed, the concept 
of a “target” company often does not apply in these transactions. In constructing the data 
set, announcement press releases were searched for the phrase “merger of equals” or 
“combination of equals” to identify these transactions, which have special features worth 
studying in their own right. Cf. Tommaso Ebhardt & Ania Nussbaum, Plunging Peugeot 
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The relationship between premium offered and deal outcome is not a 
priori obvious. On the one hand, high premiums may reflect high 
motivation on the part of acquiring companies, suggesting that the 
incidence of acquiror withdrawals might decrease with premium paid. 
On the other hand, it is conceivable that acquirors are willing to pay 
higher premiums in exchange for greater optionality to walk away from 
the deal, in which case high premiums might be associated with a 
higher frequency of adverse outcomes. Moreover, high-premium deals 
might be more susceptible to buyer’s remorse from overpaying, with 
correspondingly higher motivation to back out of a transaction ex post. 
 To gather deal premiums as of the announcement date, 
announcement press releases were reviewed to determine the per-
share consideration offered to target shareholders. Where the 
consideration included acquiror stock on the basis of a fixed exchange 
ratio, acquiror stock prices as of the day before the announcement were 
downloaded from Bloomberg L.P. in order to calculate the value of 
stock consideration. The total per-share consideration as of the day 
preceding announcement was then compared against the target’s fifty-
two-week low stock price as of that date. This fifty-two-week low was 
chosen as a common baseline. In many transactions, the target’s share 
price just prior to announcement of the definitive transaction has 
already been affected by the prospect of the transaction. For example, 
the acquiror may have made public overtures or a hostile bid in 
advance of the definitive agreement; the parties may have announced 
negotiations; the existence of negotiations may have leaked to the 
market; the target company may have announced “strategic 
alternatives” or sale process; and so forth. In all but a small number of 
cases, the fifty-two-week low excludes these preannouncement effects, 
albeit at the cost of deviating from “true” unaffected price. 
 Figure 9 shows adverse deal outcomes by premium-to-fifty-two-
week low, broken down by quartile. The correlations provide initial 
support for the hypothesis that high premiums reflect high acquiror 
motivation. The incidence of acquiror withdrawals decreases 
monotonically with this measure of deal premium. Whether deal 
premium correlates with other variables that are pertinent to deal 






in-fiat-peugeot-merger-of-equals [https://perma.cc/LT7Z-HANM] (archived Feb. 5, 2020) 
(“Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV and PSA Group went out of their way to make their 
combination as equal as possible, shedding assets, paying special dividends and 
distributing board seats. It didn’t take long for investors to figure out who the buyer is. 
Shares of Fiat Chrysler jumped 10% Thursday after the two sides announced the deal, 
billed as a 50-50 merger. Peugeot owner PSA fell by about the same amount, taking the 
typical acquirer’s hit.”). 
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Figure 9. Premium to Target’s 52-Week Low 
 
IX. LEGAL ADVISORS 
 Mergers and acquisitions are a high-profile and lucrative area of 
corporate legal practice. Clients rely on their M&A counsel to navigate 
legal and regulatory hurdles and to negotiate favorable deal terms. In 
theory, more competent and experienced M&A counsel will deliver 
better deal terms for their clients. As noted in Part I, target companies 
favor contracts that limit the acquiror’s ability to withdraw from the 
deal, while also preserving maximum optionality for the target to 
accept a third-party topping bid if one materializes.66 Acquiring 
companies prefer the opposite: contracts that preserve their ability to 
withdraw from the deal, while also limiting the target company’s 
ability to accept a third-party topping bid. 
 Figure 10 shows the twenty law firms with the leading market 
shares in the deal universe, as measured by the aggregate value of 
transactions on which the law firm served as advisor to either the 
target or acquiror. Skadden leads the league table with over $4 trillion 
in deals involving US public company targets of at least $1 billion in 
the 1996 to 2018 time period. There is a sizeable gap of over $1 trillion 
between the fourth and fifth firms. This discontinuity suggests a 
distinction between what can be labeled the “bulge bracket” M&A law 
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firms—the top four in this league table, consisting of Skadden, 
Simpson Thacher, Sullivan & Cromwell, and Wachtell—and the rest. 
 
Figure 10. Law Firm League Table 
 
 
 How do deal outcomes correlate with engagement of bulge bracket 
M&A counsel? SDC Platinum indicates the law firm(s) that advised the 
parties in each deal. Figure 11 shows adverse deal outcomes for deals 
in which only the target company engaged a bulge bracket law firm 
and those in which only the acquiring company engaged a bulge 
bracket law firm. These two categories comprise 930 deals, or a little 
more than half of the deal universe. This initial cut at the data provides 
suggestive evidence that the most experienced M&A law firms deliver 
value to their clients. Deals in which a bulge bracket firm represents 
the target but not the acquiror experience a significantly lower 
frequency of acquiror withdrawals than do those in which a bulge 
bracket firm represents the acquiror but not the target. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the most experienced M&A counsel 
(measured at the law firm level) succeed in negotiating superior deals 
for their clients, at least when matched against less experienced M&A 
counsel.67 
 
67. Cf. C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Experience and Merger 
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Figure 11. Adverse Outcomes by Party Using “Bulge Bracket” 
M&A Law Firm 
 
 
 Figure 12 provides further preliminary support for the hypothesis 
that law firms matter. Instead of showing adverse outcomes, it shows 
premium outcomes: deals in which the target later received a more 
favorable deal (from an economic perspective) than the one originally 
signed. Here again, target companies have achieved better outcomes at 
higher frequencies when they have retained bulge bracket counsel and 
the acquiror has not. Acquirors have done better—specifically, they 
have avoided the need to pony up additional consideration—when they 
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Figure 12. Premium Outcomes by Party Using “Bulge Bracket” 
M&A Law Firm 
 
 
 As with the other statistics reported in this Article, these 
correlations should be interpreted with caution. Use of bulge bracket 
counsel by one party or the other may correlate with company or deal 
characteristics in systematic ways that are relevant to deal outcomes. 
While the “target only” and “acquiror only” deals are roughly the same 
size on average—$5.4 billion and $5.6 billion, respectively—the deals 
may vary along other important dimensions. The influence of legal 
counsel on transactional outcomes has previously been studied in a 
variety of settings;68 extending these studies to M&A deal outcomes 
may be a fruitful area for future research. 
X. POSTSIGNING MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
 So called financing conditions—provisions in merger agreements 
specifying that the acquiror’s obligation to complete the transaction is 
conditioned on its ability to raise the requisite external financing—are 
very unusual in public company M&A deals. Data from SDC Platinum 
indicate that only twenty-one deals (1.2 percent of deals) in the deal 
 
68. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter 
Advantage in M&A?, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1120–21 (2019); John C. Coates IV, 
Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 
1302 (2001); Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional 
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 395 (2015); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete 
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universe contain such a condition. Of the twenty-one deals with a 
financing condition, there were four acquiror withdrawals and no other 
adverse outcomes. Given the scarcity of financing contingencies in the 
deal universe, one might hypothesize that postsigning developments in 
financial markets would have little bearing on deal outcomes. 
 Figure 13 analyzes the relationship between adverse deal 
outcomes and changes in the BBB bond spread during the period 
between deal signing and deal outcome, broken down by quartile. The 
BBB bond spread, downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Database,69 measures the difference between the yields on a basket of 
BBB-rated corporate bonds and the risk-free rate. It is commonly used 
as a measure of financial disruption, as bond spreads tend to spike 
during financial crises, when the availability of debt financing tends to 
decrease sharply.70 
 




 The figure indicates that transactions in the top quartile (i.e., 
those coinciding with the largest increase in the BBB bond spread 
between the signing date and the outcome date) experienced adverse 
outcomes with substantially greater frequency than those in lower 
 
69. FRED Economic Data, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E58Q-KQ8P] 
(archived Feb. 5, 2020).  
70. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 262–64 (1983) (explaining 
that the banking problems of the Great Depression “disrupted the credit allocation 
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quartiles. Combined acquiror withdrawals and decreases in 
consideration were 5.7 percent in top quartile, more than double the 
frequency observed in any other quartile. At least two possible 
explanations suggest themselves. First, acquirors may sometimes find 
that closing a transaction during a period of financial market 
disruption is practically or legally infeasible. Committed sources of 
debt financing may renege on their commitments; alternatively, the 
acquiror or its financing sources may conclude that completing a 
transaction under stressed conditions may constitute a fraudulent 
conveyance under applicable debtor–creditor law. Second, it may be 
that acquirors tend to exercise otherwise latent optionality in the 
merger agreements (apart from explicit financing contingencies) at 
higher frequencies during periods of financial market disruption. 
Further research on this topic may shed light on the degree to which 
“efforts” are contractible, even in high-stakes situations with 
sophisticated and deep-pocketed contracting parties. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
 Nine out of ten M&A transactions are completed on the originally 
announced economic terms. The remainder end in some other outcome: 
a successful topping bid, an amendment to the economic terms of the 
transaction, or deal failure. M&A deal breakage provides an 
opportunity for the empirical study of contracting outcomes in a high-
stakes setting with sophisticated and deep-pocketed parties, and in 
which all agreements are publicly available. This Article provides an 
initial look into a new data set that was constructed specifically for the 
study of M&A deal breakage, a topic of interest to business law 
scholars, transactional lawyers, other deal professionals, and merger 
arbitrage investors.  
